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Genetic Modification and Future Generations

David Sackris

Introduction
One of the most difficult issues to sort out morally is our
obligation to future generations. Most individuals feel that they do
indeed have some kind of obligation, but face difficulty in explaining
the exact nature of the obligation. For one, it seems impossible to know
the wants and desires of future generations, and furthermore the
existence of the persons we are obligated to is entirely dependent upon
the choices that we in fact make. In essence, we could shape future
generations so that they desire exactly what we provide for them. It
seems that no matter what principle we adopt that is based upon these
potential individuals we are led to absurd conclusions. Gregory Kavka
calls this moral grappling the Paradox of Future Individuals.1 I believe
that the ethical concerns surrounding genetic engineering should be
seen as a specific instantiation of this Paradox and that by examining
both we may be able to come up with some sort of working solution.
Derek Parfit pleads ignorance as to a solution to this Paradox after an
extensive exegesis on the issue, but as we may not be that far from
shopping a genetic supermarket to determine the characteristics of our
children I don’t believe we can settle for that conclusion. We will begin
by examining the Paradox and suggested solutions to the Paradox.
Next I will address how the Paradox relates directly to genetic
engineering and discuss how rights-based arguments aimed against
genetic engineering fail because of the nature of identity. Then I will
consider how David Heyd’s Genero-centric principle applies to genetic
1 “The Paradox of Future Individuals” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.11, No. 2 (Princeton
University Press: Spring, 1982) 93
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engineering specifically and how a modified version of that principle
may guide us out of the Paradox of Future Individuals in general. This
solution may not be acceptable to utilitarian sensibilities, but it is
because the numbers don’t add up that we may need to appeal to a
different principle entirely.
The Paradox of Future Individuals
In his essay, “The Paradox of Future Individuals,” Kavka brings to
light the contingent nature of our very existence and the implications it
has on our moral decision-making process. “Which particular future
people will exist is highly dependent upon the conditions under which
we and our descendents procreate, with the slightest difference in our
conception being sufficient, in a particular case, to ensure the creation
of a different person.”2 What this means is that if someone had called
your parents at just the right moment, you might not be you; actually,
you would not exist. What policies we decide upon determines who
meets whom, along with when and where individuals choose to
procreate. Each future person’s identity is dependent upon our
decisions, so they should have no complaint concerning the situation
they are born into. Derek Parfit sums up this situation with the TimeDependence claim: our identity is determined by the moment our
parents did in fact have sex.3 Our parents’ genetic material could have
combined in almost an infinite number of ways, and the way that they
did in fact combine was dependent upon when and how it happened.
The Time-Dependence claim relies upon the fact that different genetic
combinations result in different identities. This has important
implications for genetic modification, as its very definition involves the
manipulation and interchanging of genes. If our identity depends upon
when we were conceived, then our identity depends upon our exact set
of genes. We should view the Time-Dependence claim as a component
of the Gene-Dependence Claim: different combinations of genes result
in different persons, or more weakly, that it becomes impossible to
determine if we have the same person once genes are swapped.4
This raises an interesting paradox when considering future
generations. It seems that no matter what we do our decision is
Ibid
1984, 352
4 Parfit’s empty question: “If we accept a reductionist view, we shall believe that the identity of
such a thing may be, in a quite unpuzzling way, indeterminate,” 213. See Chapter 10 of Reasons and
Persons.
2
3

36

Macalester Journal of Philosophy

beneficial to futurity as long as we provide them with a life that is
marginally worth living; their existence depends on our actions, good or
bad. This Paradox of Future Individuals can be seen most clearly when
we consider Derek Parfit's Risky Policy.5 The Risky Policy involves the
decision between utilizing solar power now and maintaining our current
quality of life, or utilizing nuclear energy so as to slightly raise our
quality of life now. The consequence of choosing the nuclear policy is
two fold: 500 years from now people will be born who are affected by
radiation in such a way as that they will have lives worth-living but they
will die painlessly at the age of forty. Secondly, none of the same
persons will exist by choosing this policy that would also exist by
choosing the solar policy. If we choose one policy, one group of people
will actually exist in the future and if choose the other policy a different
set of individuals will actuate, and there in lies the problem. We can see
the nature of this problem if we consider Kavka's Obligation Principle:
The Obligation Principle: one can have an obligation to choose act A
over act B only if by choosing B some person would be worse off
than had one chosen A.6
The difficulty here lies in the fact that by choosing the Risky Policy, no
one is worse off, for they would not have existed were it not for our
decision; the obligation principle is strictly person-affecting7 and does not
help us decide a case where different sets of individuals would obtain.
Whether or not we want to view being born as a benefit in itself is up
for debate, but if for the most part these radiated people live lives
worth living, we have indeed benefited them.
The difficulty with this dilemma is that what might seem to be an
acceptable principle to adopt at first glance usually leads to abhorrent
conclusions. On a person affecting base, no one who ever lives is
negatively affected in the Risky Policy, so it seems that an impersonal
analysis of the situation is called for, yet this too seems to lead to
equally perplexing results. An impersonal principle will allow us to view
5 "Future Generations: Further Problems" Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.11, No. 2 (Princeton
University Press: Spring, 1982); also Reasons and Persons.
6 The Paradox of Future Individuals, 95
7 Person-affecting means that we base our decisions on benefiting and harming identified persons.
In cases where different individuals will actuate, by choosing one group over another to exist,
there is no one person who is being “harmed,” as we can not harm people who never come to
exist. Also it seems that no “person” has been harmed by the Risky policy, as their identity is
dependent upon the policy decision, without which they would not exist.
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the decision from a standpoint as to what is good for people as a
whole, not as to how whole policies affect specific individuals. In
situations such as the Risky Policy, Parfit suggests appealing to the
impersonal Wide Total Principle of Beneficence:
The Wide Total Principle: One should weigh the potential benefits to
different actual and potential people in considering option A or
option B, and choose the option that creates the greatest net
benefit. 8
This Principle works on the decision of what to do in the Risky Policy;
we should not build the nuclear plant so as to maximize the amount of
benefit to future people. This seems fine, but this principle also leads to
undesirable conclusions when we apply it to everyday life. For one, if a
couple is considering having a child, this maxim obligates them to do
so if it is reasonable that child will be happy. When weighing the
options of bringing another child into the world who can be expected
to have a good life, and since we have to include the potential benefits
in our decision making process, it seems that not having another child
would deprive some person of enormous potential benefit and rob the
world of a net benefit overall. A person can never become happy if
they never exist. It might be argued that a person can never become
unhappy though either, but if we can reasonably predict the potential
child will have a relatively good life, we are obligated to benefit him in
such a fashion. Even further, it mandates that a person use every means
possible to make the child as happy as possible, which would require
using genetic enhancing drugs, if available. Taken to the extreme, this
leads to Parfit's Z world: a world in which there are billions of people
all living at subsistence levels, yet who believe their lives to be worth
living. Parfit takes us through a course of reasoning using impersonal
moral standards that when evenly applied, lead to a world where there
is a great deal of happiness, but spread over a vast quantity of people.9
It also seems that the person affecting principle can lead to this
conclusion: if causing a person to exist is a benefit to them and that
benefit outweighs the loss of utility to the rest of society, we will once
again find ourselves in the Z-world with millions of people living the
8 “Future Generations,” 137. There is also the Wide Average Principle, and in this version we
should substitute “greatest net benefit” with “greatest average benefit.” Since Parfit believes these
both lead to the same conclusion, I will not differentiate them in this discussion.
9 Reasons and Persons, Ch. 17
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most marginally satisfying lives that we can imagine. We can image a
different sort of Z-world coming into existence when parents are
obligated to modify their children in order to measure up to some
impersonal standard of good genes: millions of people with the same
interests, or aesthetics, or intelligence level, or what have you. Perhaps
to some this does not seem as repugnant as Parfit’s Z-world, but it is
bad in the same way in that there seems to be no moral principle to tell
us why we should avoid this outcome.
Parfit does not know the solution to this conundrum, but believes
some middle principle must be found to cover both our immediate
offspring and farther away generations. These principles also present a
difficulty for genetic issues we face now or will soon face. The closer to
home analogy of the Risky Policy is the Motherly 14-year-old girl.10 A
14-year-old girl wants to conceive a child, yet she is advised to put it off
to give the child a better start in life. This seems like good advice, yet
Parfit points out that if the 14-year-old girl has that child, it is not worse
for that particular child. Parfit believes that the objection to this
decision is that she could have given another child a better start in life
(based on the Wide Total Principle). On the other hand, Parfit can
imagine that this child would waive his right to a better start in life in
order to exist, but the morality of this decision should not be based
upon the fact that most people are happy to be alive. A person would
waive a right to a good start in life in order to exist, but perhaps this is
only because it is difficult to imagine never having existed. This is a
perfect example of the conflict between the two views: on the personaffecting view it is just as good to have either child, as both will be
benefited; on the wide impersonal view it is best to have the happier
child, all things considered (and then as many more children as you can
reasonably support).
It seems that by appealing to an impersonal principle we have
solved the difficulty of what to do with the Motherly 14-year-old girl.
Because either action will result in the same number of people coming
into existence, the Wide Total Principle we established earlier mandates
that she wait so as to provide the greatest net benefit and captures our
general moral sentiments on the issue. But with the specter of genetic
engineering on the horizon, it seems we are fast approaching the
unwanted implications that led us to Parfit’s Z-world above. Just as the
Wide-Total Principle obligated us above to have as many children as we
10

1984, 358-359
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can support, it seems to force us to use genetic engineering on our
children. Presented the choice between making our child smarter/
stronger or not through modification, the Wide Total Principle requires
that we choose that which creates the most benefit, genetic
modification.
Possible Solutions
By considering the Paradox of Future Individuals we have seen
that ordinary ethical principles break down when we try to apply them
to future generations. This must lead us to one of two possible
conclusions: we are applying our principles to future generations in the
wrong way, or that our principles for dealing with existing persons
cannot be applied to future generations. Most utilitarians argue that we
are applying our Wide Impersonal Principle in the wrong way. I will
consider these arguments and show that there is not any way to apply a
Wide Impersonal Principle to future generations coherently.
One suggested way out of our quagmire is to postulate that we do
have a moral obligation to prevent people from being worse off, i.e.
genetic treatment, but that this does not oblige us to benefit persons
(by having more, faster/stronger children). Let’s see if this distinction
can solve our problems by abandoning our Motherly 14-year-old, as she
just wants to have some kids, and turning to a more morally clear-cut
example, from a utility standpoint. If we know that we will produce a
wretched child whose life will be short and filled with pain, we are
morally obligated to avoid conceiving this child. On the other hand,
even if we are able to give birth to what is expected to be a happy child,
we have no moral obligation to give life to such a child.
Jan Narveson wishes to avoid the implications of the impersonal
utilitarian view, notably that our obligation to benefit extends to having
as many children as we can. He notes that utilitarianism does not
demand the greatest happiness and the greatest number, but that we are
to aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number.11 Narveson
wants to argue that the question of whether or not to have a child is a
non-moral one, similar to deciding on whether or not to engage in
some pleasurable experience, such as eating a candy bar; one has no
duty to make oneself happy. His argument turns on the fact that no one
has been made happier by being born, and hence this issue is also out of
the moral realm. “The child cannot be made happier as a result of being
11 Narveson, Jan “Utilitarianism and New Generations,” Mind New Series, Vol. 76, No. 301
(Oxford University Press: Jan, 1967) 62
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born, since we then have a relative term lacking some relatum…” and
since no one else’s happiness is directly affected, there is no moral
reason to bring him into existence. Unfortunately, this premise does
not support his conclusion; although he believes that having children is
non-moral, he wants to avoid causing the miserable child to exist:
“Since if you cannot make someone happy by bearing him, you also
cannot make him miserable by doing so, nevertheless in many such
cases, e.g., the slum-dwelling case, you will actually have inflicted misery
on the child, by underfeeding him…”12 Narveson has already
concluded that child-bearing is non-moral to avoid obligatory births, so
therefore we cannot “create” happiness. But if causing the miserable
child to exist is impermissible, on what grounds is it so? It must be
because we are “creating” unhappiness; otherwise, this is just as nonmoral as abstaining from creating the happy child. It seems that
Narveson is trying to sidestep Parfit by replacing “benefit” with
“happier.” With questions of existence, there is no one to be made
happier, which is a utilitarian obligation, and so Narveson thinks he has
defeated the objection. But this can’t work if he still frowns upon
making someone who is unhappy. If a miserable life can be worse than
never existing, how is a good life not better than never existing?
Timothy Sprigge also gives a penetrating analysis on the basis of
symmetry similar to my own analysis of Narveson’s position. From
Narveson’s non-moral stance on causing to exist he concludes that if
existence cannot make people happier or less happy, when considering
having a child, the interests of that child “cannot be considered as
‘those of a party whose interests are in question.’”13 Narveson wants to
avoid this conclusion and compares the desire to have a child to a
consideration of “embarking on a course of action.”14 If one can see
that there will be insoluble problems on the road ahead, we should not
embark on the journey; but even if one can see that the problems
would be soluble, perhaps easily, he asks us, “Is that, in itself, a point in
favor of embarking on the course of action? Most certainly not! ...
There would have to something else said for it, in its own right.”15 This
argument does not seem to appeal to any moral sensibilities, except
maybe to avoid hardship. For one, even if one can foresee that a
journey will or may have insoluble difficulties, one may still have
Ibid, 70-71
Narveson, Jan “Moral Problems of Population.” The Monist, p. 75
14 Ibid, 77
15 Ibid, 76
12
13
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reasons for embarking upon it. I’m thinking of a quest here, where it’s
more in the hardships endured than the end in itself. One may honestly
believe that a hard life in the slums will provide his child with the
strong fortitude he needs to survive this rough and tumble world.
Secondly, I think one can morally reprimand someone for not
embarking on a journey that they could easily undertake. Specifically
I’m thinking of an article I read in an English newspaper in Germany.
The columnist was berating German men for choosing to live with
their mothers well into their thirties and not starting families. It was this
writer’s opinion that embarking on the journey of starting a family was
part of being a man, and if you had the financial wherewithal, you had
better get started. In her moral conception of what it is to be a man,
included is finally “growing up,” as I believe she put it, and starting a
family. In fact, if this is your conception of what it is to be a man, then
one should start a family regardless of the perceived obstacles. It seems
that, on the basis of symmetry, an impersonal account has yet to be
saved.
Perhaps we can escape the implications of the Gene-Dependence
claim – that our choices result in different persons – by attacking its
internal logic, which is the path Matthew Hanser takes. One of Parfit’s
basic premises, and the major source of our difficulty, is that if
someone has a life worth living, this is better than having no life at all,
regardless of some harm that might be inflicted upon that person. The
logic in the instance of the Motherly 14-year-old girl can be laid out
quite plainly: (1) The people or person a choice causes to be bad off
still has a life worth living (by stipulation). (2) These people would not
have existed had our choices that caused them to exist not been made.
(3) “A choice benefits someone, in the morally relevant sense, if its
consequence is that the person receives a benefit that he would not
have received had the choice not been made.” Therefore, (4) by causing
someone to exist with a life worth living, our benefit to that person
morally outweighs the way in which we may have caused that person to
be badly off, assuming existence is a benefit.16 Hanser believes (3) is
wrong in that most actions only accidentally affect the identities of
individuals because they only accidentally affect who has sex with
whom. “Prior to people’s actual conception there can be no foreknowledge of who will come into existence if one policy is adopted and
who will come into existence if another is adopted, no agent could
16 Hanser, Matthew “Harming Future People,” Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 19, No.1
(Princeton University Press: Winter 1990) 59
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possibly make a particular [decision] in order to ensure of [one group
of] people’s coming into existence rather than another’s…When the
choice between two policies is a same number [of people] choice, that
choice cannot be based on the policies’ respective effects on the
identities of future people.”17
This seems a fair assessment, if we want to assign moral worth to
something, we should blame the mother for conceiving a child under
such-and-such bad circumstances, but I’m not sure that we are on safe
ground quite yet. For one, what if some woman lives in abject poverty
yet desires to become a mother? It seems that in this instance we
should either only consider the interests of that future person or only
consider the interests of the mother. If becoming a mother would make
this woman happy, and it is unforeseeable that her situation will
improve, it seems we should not necessarily reprimand her for having a
child, for she is increasing her own happiness by fulfilling her desire for
children and having a child under the only conditions she could
foreseeably have a child. In this instance it seems that we must choose
one perspective from which to address this issue. Either this mother
should do what will fulfill her desires, or should abstain from that
fulfillment if she cannot be sure she can provide a decent life for her
child.
We have seen how even a modified impersonal principle breaks
down when considering futurity, but now it seems faced with an even
greater difficulty; the impersonal principle cannot clearly tell us what
the best decision is based on the consideration of the potential child
alone. We have found ourselves in the warped situation of deciding if
one unhappy poor woman is better over all than one happy poor
mother plus an unhappy child. The more pertinent question this raises
to our discussion is whether we can continue to consider the interests
of the potential child when considering genetic modification, or in any
decision.
Genetic Considerations
The problem with banning genetic enhancement while at the same
time allowing gene therapy is that we run into the same problem as
above; that is, we can’t justify a prohibition against creating miserable
children without mandating that we produce happy children. Above we
considered the difficulty of finding a principle that can tell us what to
17

Ibid, 61-62
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do in an event in which our decision influences what persons will exist.
The same is true in a much more immediate way when considering
genetic engineering; when choosing to modify our offspring’s genes, we
are without a doubt creating new individuals. One of the problems
surrounding the ethics of genetic engineering is that most ethicists have
never considered it as a mere substantiation of the Paradox of Future
Individuals, but due to the nature of the Gene-Dependence Claim it is
exactly the same. Our decisions immediately effect what persons will
exist, so it seems if we can find a principle to work with in this situation
we should be able to apply that back to the general Paradox discussed
above.
An appeal to the modified Impersonal Principle discussed above is
clearly inadequate here for the same reasons. Although it appears that
this situation should be easier to solve morally, as it always involves the
same number of people who ever live, an appeal to Parfit’s Same
Number Quality Claim can do no good here.
The Same Number Quality Claim: If in either of two possible
outcomes the same number of people ever live, it would be worse
if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than
those who would have lived.18
In cases of genetic enhancement, it is clear that being enhanced leaves
someone better off, or there would be no fear of enhancement to begin
with. Therefore not enhancing leaves someone worse off than a
different possible person could have been.
Whether or not these individuals are substantially changed is not
the point, what matters is that we have no way of knowing whom we
started with and whom we are ending up with, and the same is true in
decisions regarding futurity. If we can set aside the disability rights
movement for a moment, we should consider if we honestly believe
that genetically “curing” a baby in the womb of Downs syndrome is
really going to provide us with the “same” person. It is true that we
don’t want to use as a referent an “HIV infected person,” but a “person
infected with HIV,” in order to separate the person from his disorder,19
but in the case of genetic disorders that disorder literally constitutes
Parfti, 360
Gunderson, Martin. “Human Rights and Genetic Engineering” unpublished, pg. 9 Gunderson
is discussing germ-line engineering in the sense of preventing disease, so I am taking this a little
out of context, but I think he would consent to my usage.

18
19
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that identity. We can speak of someone returning to normal after
fighting off an infection, but in the case of genetic disorder, there is
nothing to return to. Although this position would maintain that
somatic modification then results in a different person, I don’t have a
problem with that implication as we can imagine persons changing in
trivial ways, especially if we subscribe to Parfit’s theory of personal
identity
It seems probable that we could genetically modify people in
seemingly “harmless” ways, such as modifying eye color, but it seems
impossible to know that after the modification that we do indeed have
the same person in a meaningful way. Personhood can be fluid, and
following Parfit we can say that some identity questions can be empty,
but questions concerning genetic identity cannot be empty in the same
way. The difference lies in that if there is some further fact that
constitutes psychological identity, it is unknowable; on the other hand,
we can actually know if a person’s genetics have been changed. The
question is still empty, but only in that we cannot be certain that a
genetic modification is trivial or reconstitutional of identity; it is
meaningful because we know that we do not have the same exact
person genetically and never will (and perhaps this would add weight to
deciding against altering a child). To decide which genetic changes are
trivial and which are meaningful we would have to find a genetic “core”
which constitutes identity, and this argument will be addressed shortly.
As most arguments against enhancement but for therapy seem to
be person-affecting, I hope to show that on a basis of symmetry we
cannot have one without the other and then suggest that we adopt a
version of David Heyd’s parentocentric model if we want some place
to posit morality in all this. Above we wanted to commit people to
avoid having the miserable child, but not obligate them to have happy
children and that turned out to be untenable. We also wanted to dictate
that the 14-year-old girl hold off on her conception, yet we are uneasy
with the mandate that we must provide the most possible benefits for
our child. Here we want to commit parents (or at least allow) to curing
genetic disease but not require (or not allow) them to enhance their
children. If we have learned anything from the discussion above, it
seems that this distinction is set up to fail.
We have already seen that an impersonal position cannot guide us
because of the implications it has on persons living now (namely, to
have as many children as possible). But we disliked the person-affecting
view because it seemed then no matter what we do it is morally good.
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If we are still committed to focusing on the child, we have two options:
a revision of the person-affecting view, or an appeal to the rights of the
potential individual. I believe that a revision of the person-affecting
view may have some merits, but that a right’s based analysis is bound to
fail. David Heyd notes that “It is exactly the individualistic factor
characterizing the rights-based view that makes rights-based theories
incapable of dealing with genesis problems.”20 A rights-based analysis,
if successful, should tell us how we should genetically modify and by
doing so generally establish a duty to future generations.
Rights of the Child
One reason given for why we should not allow parents free reign in
the genetics of their offspring is that there is a “concern about parents
using genetic intervention to make their children suitable only for a
particular and idiosyncratic conception of a good life that the parents
happen to have.”21 What Buchanan is suggesting is that we need to
allow potential children an “open future.” Buchanan goes on to say that
“the requirement that parents respect their children’s right to an open
future is important not only because it preserves some prospect of
adult autonomy for the child, but also…the best interests of the child
may not coincide with parental judgments about what is best.”22
To start with, this whole principle is based on the assumption that
through genetics parents could somehow program their child.
Assuming parents could genetically engineer their children to have
stellar physiques, this doesn’t imply that because their genes program
for a naturally toned body means those same genes will also cause that
person to desire athletic exercise.23 It seems that this would need to be
coupled with basic parental coercion (something like crazy-gluing a
plastic golf club to your three-year-old) in order to essentially wipe out
any autonomy your child might have in choosing a future. The idea that
we are violating “someone’s” rights in genetic enhancement does not
even make sense when we consider that our decisions are creating that
person’s identity. In fact this suggests that unborn people can somehow
Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) 41
Buchanan, et. al. 170
22 Ibid, 172
23 Dawkins, Richard “Genetic Determinism and Gene Selctionism,” edited by Justine Burley and
Richard Harris (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 253-270. “Genes do not control behavior
directly in the sense of interfering in [the person’s] performance. They only control behavior in
the sense of programming the machine in advance of the performance” (his italics) pg. 259 Most
importantly Dawkins points out that you can’t infer an “ought” from an “is.” Because your son is
in good shape does not mean he ought to love (and be good at) football.
20
21
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“prefer” one identity over another. Of course I’ll ask the obvious
question: where can this preference come from?24

The potential person has no more interest in a certain identity than in being born. Within a
person-affecting view it is only the interests of actual people [the parents, maybe society]
which can dictate the choice of identity of new people. Beyond the general debate on the
legitimacy of applying principles of distributive justice to genetic endowment, we can affirm
that people do not logically have a right to any genetic endowment, if that constitutes their
identity.25

The right to a certain identity seems to imply a right to be born, as this
is the only way we can express our identity, which we have a right to. It
also seems to imply that parents should refrain from influencing their
children in identity constituting ways. It is worth keeping in mind that
parents purposely shape their children with each decision they make: to
raise them as religious or agnostic, to send them to private school or
public school, etc., etc. We expect parents to mold their children in a
certain way and basically give them free reign in that decision-making
process. On top of this, we often blame the parents for morally
bankrupt children, yet the right to an open future seems to imply that
impressing a specific code of ethics upon one’s children is far too
restrictive, that we should toss them into a Hobbesian environment and
let them figure out their own social contract.
One further consideration is worth addressing. Some may postulate
that there is some kind of “core” identity which cannot be violated and
which children have a right to. I am sure it is clear from my argument
that I do not believe in such a thing, and furthermore the burden of
proof is on those who do, but besides this we must ask how we would
even know if that core had been violated.26 Of course we can’t, but if
such a thing existed we would have to know for legal reasons what
exactly it comprised for cases of genetic treatment. If some doctor,
while performing genetic treatment for Tay-Sachs violates (in utero, we
must assume) that person’s “core” identity, can we sue? To suppose
that having Tay-Sachs is less identity composing than being tall (or
being intelligent) seems arbitrary. If we engineer for either we are
producing a different person. The answer as to what constitutes an
Buchanan, 165 "The notion of choosing one's character... when taken literally is incoherent.
One must have a character to make judgments on sets of values and preferences." What we have
here is an existential problem.
25 Heyd, 120
26 Parfit, Reasons and Persons I owe this point to his person-spectrum thought experiment. Though
I think the experiment is somewhat tainted, it is still convincing. Also, we can imagine it working
equally well with some real world affliction like Alzheimer’s.
24
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identity is that there is no one thing and that is exactly why we cannot
weigh certain genetic traits against each other. It is easy to imagine
being black or Asian or extremely tall, but it is not easy to imagine how
that would influence your personality. One is inclined to think that one
would have the same personality inside that body, when that is not the
case at all. We can’t imagine being raised with different genes, and so
we cannot base these decisions on how the children will feel about the
genes they have been given or deprived of. In reality they have not
gained or lost anything. There is nothing to base these considerations
upon besides the desires of the parents.
Although that was not a full account of all rights-based considerations, I believe I have shown that rights-based considerations cannot
give us a good frame of reference on how to treat even our immediate
offspring, let alone far further generations. We could take into
consideration notions of equality of opportunity for future generations,
but then this would mean we have no reason to try to improve things,
which also seems absurd. We can now turn to reforming the personaffecting principle. Above I took Hanser’s statements to imply that we
should levy our moral condemnation against the mother who illadvisably conceives. This is the parent-affecting view of Heyd. This is
not Hanser’s view; he wants to focus on the morality of the action as it
affects those who are created by it.
Considerations of Symmetry and the Genero-centric Model
In considering future Non-identity problems, Hanser argues for an
asymmetrical person-affecting position against Parfit’s Non-identity
problem by arguing that in the case of the Risky Policy, we are in fact
harming future individuals, even if we don’t know “who” we are
harming. He states, “I conclude that there is no special explanation
needed for why choosing Parfit’s Risky Policy is objectionable. The fact
that it is a same number choice and not a same people choice is
irrelevant… So when we choose [the] Risky Policy, we risk becoming
responsible both for people suffering harms and for people having a
disease that it is bad for them to have. I think that either risk is
sufficient to provide a recognizably “person-affecting” objection to our
choice.”27 He believes that the consequence of our choosing the risky
policy is “that people end up being harmed more than they would have
been had we chosen differently.”28 This does not seem to make much
27
28
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sense, how can these people end up being “harmed more than they
would have been” when had we chosen differently, they would have
never existed in order to feel that they were harmed? Here we will
consider Heyd’s response to Hanser’s claim that we are affecting
persons and then turn to Heyd’s Genero-centric (same as parentocentric) view as a possible alternative to the various principles that have
been discussed.
Heyd believes that there is “a characteristic equivocation in Hanser’s
argument, as he simultaneously contends that, ‘had the radiation not
leaked, they would have gone on leading happy lives’ (Hanser, 1990, 56).
But this is obviously not the case, since the leaking of the radiation is
tied up in their very existence. The equivocation is in [Hanser’s]
description of the event…”29 Hanser wants to view the immorality as
allowing radiation to leak that causes the death of actual people, but then
he is brushing aside the stipulations in Parfit’s argument. The nuclear
radiation leads “both to the existence of certain people and to the
radioactive catastrophe.” It seems we still need to find a more impersonal theory.
The conclusion that Heyd reaches is that the only way to
genethically treat our immediate offspring is by considering our own
personal desires, for appealing to the wants and identity of someone
who may or may not actuate only leads to absurd conclusions. A mother
who refuses to wait to give birth to a child, that if she did so he would
not be born with some handicap, is the one we should direct our moral
condemnation towards. The conception itself, on Heyd's parentocentric
view, is neither good nor bad, better or worse than nothing. All that
there is possible is good and bad decisions made by actually existing
parents.
My contention is that the moral status of potential beings is denied on logical grounds, the
prospects of the value of the potential being cannot be of any relevance. There is full
symmetry in [parentocentrism] between reasons for producing happy children and those for
not creating unhappy ones... [Symmetry] means that it is equally meaningless to resent our
parents for being unhappy as it is to be grateful for having been born happy30

This view allows us to treat our immediate generation consistently
and evaluate decisions to have children independently of the effect it will
have on them, even though this remains counterintuitive. Heyd suggests
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the limits of genetic engineering may be the “point where we would stop
considering our offspring as ours.”31
Heyd’s parentocentric model works very well with what I wanted
to accomplish, that any genetic engineering means all genetic
engineering, but it is unclear if his view can help us decide upon issues
of futurity. If this same seems principle can help us determine the
morality of genetic engineering then it should determine our duty
towards future generations. Yet a strict following of Heyd’s parentocentric model when applied to future generations leads to conclusions
that he is willing to accept, but that I for one, cannot. Heyd says, “If we
cannot take the nature of society or the nature of persons as given a
priori, then we have to decide on both simultaneously.”32 This means
that our duty towards future generations should be determined solely
by the desires and wants of actual people existing now, just as in the
case above. Heyd admits that his theory “cannot in principle rule out
the willful conception of a defective child, or an irresponsibly
expanding population leading to an ‘overcrowded,’ Z-like world; nor
can it prohibit the engineering of ‘happy pigs’ as substitutes for human
beings, or indeed the total extinction of the human race by a voluntary
act of collective suicide.”33 Heyd is willing to accept these implications
of his theory because he believes that there are many mitigating factors
which will stop us from allowing these things to happen. For one, we
actually do live with some future generations. “According to this view,
the psychology of parental concern is the philosophical basis for ethical
concern.”34 A corollary of this is that we know in fact that there will be
future generations no matter what we do, and this also gives us some
sense of duty.
He is willing to admit that we can only plausibly feel connections
with the next two or three generations, and if that’s what how actual
people feel, than they should base their decisions upon those feelings.35
Heyd believes that even though this is so, we should regard our
concern with our immediate offspring, our desire to save for our
children and grandchildren, as an empirical constraint on genethical
principles. “In this case, transitivity guarantees that even in the long run
the natural parental wish to see one’s children at least as well-off as
Heyd, 174
Heyd, 83
33 Heyd, 193
34 Heyd, 193
35 Heyd, 193
31
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oneself could support a principle of just savings. These considerations
serve to mitigate the repugnant implications of abstract generocentrism
[same as parentocentrism].”36 Heyd’s general argument, and what he
sees as freeing us from many Parfitian implications, is that it is humans
who value the world, not who add value to the world. Therefore, there
is no best world, or optimal population. Good, on the person-affecting
view, is whatever people deem to be good for people.37
I agree with Heyd that the only things that are good are those that
are good for actual people, but this does not successfully capture our
moral feelings towards future generations (as Parfit might say), by simply
embracing that each generation is self-centered. Heyd basically believes
we should do the best we can, within reason, and future people who will
actually exist should just deal with it. “Notice too that human values and
preferences gradually change with regard to the desirable conditions of
the environment. We are willing today to accept many of the environmental changes brought about by motor transportation because we have
become used to a less pristine environment.”38 No matter what we
decide, future people will become used to, and so in the case of the risky
policy we can expect people to become used to living short lives. This
doesn’t seem like a legitimate conclusion.
In the case of genetic modification, it is good for people that we
eliminate disease, increase the immune system, and make people more
intelligent if possible; but it does not seem good for many people now or
in the future to genetically engineer for skin color or eye type, unless we
can reasonably believe that people will always value diversity. And yet,
the parentocentric models seems to condone the idea that we should
“not ignore the desires of any, for they are all human desires,”39 and
Heyd would add, as long as they exist now. I do not want to bring
myself to say this, as laissez-faire as I feel about genetic modification, but
it seems we should ignore some desires if they would infringe on a
pluralistic conception of beauty and the good life.
A Consideration of Values
Heyd touches upon some kind of solution to the possibility that
actual human desires could lead to some sort of homogenous society,
and does not rely solely on the thought that they just probably won’t.
Heyd, 193
Heyd, Ch. 5
38 Heyd, 207
39 Parens, 247
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Heyd believes that the number of people that there should be is limited
by “our power to manipulate the environment so as to accommodate
the numbers of people we wish to have without harming the interests of
existing (actual) people or undermining the life of potential people as we
would wish them to have.”40 This last phrase, “as we would wish them
to have” is interesting, and is a point that Heyd could elaborate upon. A
generocentric model assumes an accepted system of ethics (we should
condemn the mother who knowingly conceives a child while suffering
from rubella, not judge the worth of that child), but doesn’t necessarily
give us a good reason to care about the moral situation in the far future.
If there is a chance that, through genetic engineering and the various
policy decisions that are made, people in the far future are not much like
us, is there any sort of life that we can wish them to have? I don’t
believe genetic engineering will run amuck, but if parents living now do
not instill the in their children the value of heterogeneity, then in some
future it seems possible that all people will look uniform.41 We can only
wish for people to have a certain type or quality of life as far as we wish
for future people to have the same ethical principles as ourselves.
Although I am taking Alisdair MacIntyre completely out of context here,
if “personal identity isolated from narrative, intelligibility and accountability is bound to fail”42 is true, then it seems that considering future
generations outside of our own society’s values and history are bound to
fail, which Heyd himself seems to be getting at.43
Presently and throughout a great deal of human history, we value
long life in order to complete our life projects, to be able to spend time
with the generations that we beget, and the like. If we instill these
values into our own children, regardless of where these values come
from, it seems that this is where we should find the Risky Policy
lacking. If we consciously perpetuate what is valued in our society, yet
disregard those values in our social planning because no one is being
harmed, what is being harmed are the values of our society. If we don’t
think the Risky Policy is bad, we should glut it up as much as we can
and make a pact to not have any more children, or have all the children
we want but not bother to try and raise them. We feel the Risky Policy
is bad because we think our society’s values (or whatever personal
Heyd, 208
Not necessarily white, I might add, although this is usually the assumption. Asian seems like a
good choice, as this would be the most expedient for achieving homogeneity.
42 After Virtue. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. 218
43 This could be the “deep psychological motives” that he believes mitigates the chance of people
choosing the risky policy on his person-affecting basis, 193
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values make one detest the Risky Policy), for the most part, are good.
The same goes with genetic engineering: if we think diversity is good,
yet engineer our child to look a certain way, there is no way this value
will be passed on. Although I don’t agree with Heyd that begetting
offspring has some transcendental, immortal purpose, I agree that “an
awareness of temporal extension (both to the past and to the future) [is]
a precondition for the meaning of life. This is a typically personaffecting value, that is, it views the identity of actual (present) human
beings as partly constituted by the heritage of past generations and by
the projects that can be achieved only by future ones.”44
MacIntyre seems to agree with Heyd in the respect that our morals
and the formation of our identity are influenced by those who came
before us. “One of the concepts of a virtue… is that it always requires
for its application the acceptance for some prior account of certain
features of social moral life in terms of which it has be defined and
explained.”45 In the case of the Risky Policy we have in a way deprived
the future people of living a “good life” by the standards, or practice as
MacIntyre would call it, of those who came before them, as many
conceptions of a good life involve longevity and raising a family.
Although their life might not be all bad, it might not seem worth much
when viewed historically; it seems that previous generations deemed the
future one unworthy of the life they had and not worthy of engaging in
the established practices. By choosing the Risky Policy we choose to
disown some of the values of our society, and this is person-affecting.
It is person-affecting in the sense that existing people are willingly disowning some of their values, or believing the future does not deserve
them. Just as we should hold a mother morally accountable for
conceiving the child in poor circumstances, we should hold the
decision makers morally accountable for disowning those things which
we hold dear.
This is not a very utilitarian solution to what many would deem to
be a utility problem. This doesn’t tell us directly how many people there
should be, or what those people should be like. But Heyd suggests a
person-affecting model does indirectly: if we value natural beauty, then
we should not overpopulate and pollute certain areas; if we value
diversity, individuals should value it within their own offspring.46 It
seems the Paradox of Future Individuals for now cannot be solved by
Heyd, 222
MacIntyre, 186
46 Heyd, Ch. 7, Ecology
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appealing to those very individuals, as they may or may not come to
exist. What seems more effective is an appeal to the conditions that
would allow such decisions to be made.
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